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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Michael Kenner appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress
evidence obtained in a search of his person incident to his concededly lawful arrest. On
appeal, Kenner argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress
because the search violated the Fourth Amendment “in light of the manner and place in
which the search was conducted.” (Appellant’s brief, p.1.)
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On the night of October 28, 2015, acting on information that Michael Kenner was
selling methamphetamine in Heyburn, the Cassia County Sheriff’s Office and the MiniCassia Drug Task Force set up a controlled buy operation between Kenner and a
Confidential Informant (“CI”), in which the CI would purchase “between a quarter ounce
to a half ounce of methamphetamine from Mike Kenner.” (Tr., p.20, L.21 – p.23, L.12.)
Officer Colin Widmier, Kenner’s parole officer, went along with the Drug Task Force to
assist with Kenner and to arrest Kenner pursuant to an outstanding warrant for
absconding supervision. (Tr., p.7, L.22 – p.8, L.10.)
Detectives Matthew Love and Jordan Williams of the Mini-Cassia Drug Task
Force served as surveillance during the drug buy. (Tr., p.52, Ls.8-12.) The detectives
provided the CI with a wire. (Tr., p.52, Ls.13-21.) The detectives followed the CI to a
residential home in Heyburn where they observed Kenner exit the home and enter the car
with the CI. (Tr., p.24, Ls.2-10.) The CI drove to a driveway across from a park and
parked the car. (Tr., p.24, Ls.11-14). The detectives could hear Kenner over the wire
“pointing out cars that he thought looked suspicious or were possibly law enforcement
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vehicles.” (Tr., p.24, Ls.15-19.) As the CI started to drive away, Lieutenant Horak of the
Drug Task Force turned on his lights and stopped the CI’s car “[f]or the safety of the CI.”
(Tr., p.24, L.23 – p.25, L.7; p.54, L.2 – p.55, L.6.)
Detective Williams and Officer Widmier approached the passenger side of the
CI’s car where Kenner was seated. (Tr., p.8, L.24 – p.9, L.7; p.55, Ls.7-15.) Officer
Widmier instructed Kenner to “show [] his hands and to get out of the vehicle.” (Tr. p.8,
L.24 – Tr. p.9, L.7.) Kenner refused to cooperate. (Tr., p.9, Ls.8-18; R., p.250.)

The

officers repeated their commands multiple times before they had “to pull him out of the
vehicle” and place him on the ground. (Tr., p.9, Ls.8-18; p.55, L.23 – p.56, L.1; R.,
p.250.) While being arrested, Kenner “was trying to put his hands down the back of his
pants” and continued to do so even after the officers put him in handcuffs. (Tr., p.9, Ls.818; p.56, Ls.6-13; R., p.250.) Detective Williams testified at the suppression hearing that
this was “indicative of somebody who’s trying to destroy evidence or get rid of
evidence.” (Tr., p.58, Ls.16-23.)
While Detective Williams and Officer Widmier were occupied with Kenner,
Detective Love was simultaneously talking with the CI. (Tr., p.25, L.25 – p.27, L.3; R.,
p.250.) The CI stated “that he believed that Mike [Kenner] had the methamphetamine in
his buttocks area.”

(Tr. p.27, Ls.4-8; R., p.250.)

One of the officers passed that

information along to Detective Williams at some point prior to his search of Kenner.
(Tr., p.56, Ls.14-18; p.57, Ls.3-9.)
After placing Kenner in handcuffs, Detective Williams took Kenner to the back of
Lieutenant Horak’s police car. (Tr., p.56, Ls.2-5.) The officers “had to secure him
against the vehicle because he was continuously not listening to the commands and stop
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reaching for things.” (Tr., p.28, L.18 – p.29, L.3; R., p.250.) Kenner was on the side of
the road but not exposed to traffic. (Tr., p.29, Ls.21-23.) Officer Widmier was on
Kenner’s left side; another officer was on Kenner’s right side; Detective Williams was
directly behind him; and there were multiple police vehicles behind Detective Williams.
(Tr., p.9, L.19 – p.10, L.5; p.19, Ls.14-20; p.68, Ls.13-19.) Detective Williams testified
that “there was no way anybody could see around us.” (Tr., p.68, Ls.13-19.) In addition
to the cover provided by the officers and their vehicles, it was so dark that the officers
“had to assist [them]selves with flashlights.” (Tr., p.19, Ls.8-13.)
Officer Widmier asked Detective Williams to search Kenner “[b]ecause he had a
warrant for his arrest.” (Tr., p.10, Ls.6-8; p.56, Ls.19-21.) Kenner’s pants were “loose”
at the time. (Tr., p.57, Ls.13-17.) Detective Williams “pulled them back” and “could see
the plastic baggy in there,” which was protruding from Kenner’s buttocks. (Tr., p.57,
Ls.13-23; R., p.253.) Detective Williams “didn’t pull [Kenner’s] pants down, [he] simply
pulled them back.” (Tr., p.68, Ls.13-19; p.45, Ls.12-13; p.58, Ls.12-13; R., p.253.)
Detective Williams, while wearing a glove, reached in and grabbed the bag. (Tr., p.57,
Ls.13-17.) The search lasted five to ten seconds. (Tr., p.29, Ls.13-14; R., p.250.)
The package retrieved from Kenner contained approximately 11.4 grams of
methamphetamine as well as some marijuana. (Tr., p.30, Ls.2-12; p.59, L.15 – p.60,
L.12.) Kenner was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to
deliver. (R., p.250.) Although Kenner did not challenge the legitimacy of the arrest, he
moved to suppress the drug evidence under the Fourth Amendment arguing that the
manner and scope of the search conducted meant that it was “not a reasonable search
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incident to arrest” and that the officers lacked any sufficient justification for the manner
in which the search was conducted. (R., p.245.)
The district court denied Kenner’s motion to suppress after finding that “the
search was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances” as a search incident to
arrest.

(R., pp.249-254.) The district court based its conclusion on a series of factual

findings, including finding that:
The testimony during the hearing indicated that officers placed Mr. Kenner
against the car, pulled out the waistband of Mr. Kenner’s pants and
underwear, and retrieved the concealed drugs without touching Mr.
Kenner below the waist or exposing Mr. Kenner to a third-party. The
retrieval lasted only five to ten seconds. Finally, the search was conducted
at night, on the side of the road, with no third-party present at the scene.
(R., p.253.)
Following the denial of his motion to suppress, Kenner entered a conditional
guilty plea to the offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance in violation of Idaho
Code § 37-2732(c)(1). (R., pp.270-73.) Kenner timely appealed. (R., pp.311-14.)
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ISSUE
Kenner states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Kenner’s motion to suppress
evidence?
(Appellant’s brief, p.6)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Kenner failed to show that the district court erred in denying Kenner’s motion
to suppress drugs where an officer conducted a five-to-ten-second “reach-in” search to
remove the drugs from inside of Kenner’s pants without touching Kenner below the waist
or exposing him to a third party?
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ARGUMENT
Kenner Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His
Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
The district court correctly found that a five-to-ten-second “reach-in” search of

Kenner’s person did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it was conducted as a
search incident to a concededly lawful arrest. Kenner concedes that the officers had legal
authority to place him under arrest and to search him incident to that arrest. (Appellant’s
brief, p.9.) His argument to the district court below and now to this Court on appeal is
that the search was conducted in an unreasonable manner. (Appellant’s brief, pp.9-10;
R., p.251.) This argument fails because, although Kenner repeatedly characterizes this as
a case about a strip search conducted in public, the uncontested factual findings made by
the district court paint a much different picture. The factual findings made by the district
court show that the officers conducted the least invasive search possible without risking
the destruction of the illegal drugs on Kenner’s person, and they did so in less than ten
seconds, at night, without exposing Kenner to the public or touching Kenner below the
waist, and outside the presence of any third party. That is an entirely reasonable search
given Kenner’s decision to hide the contraband in his buttocks.
In addition, the search here was reasonable because Kenner consented to the
search. As a parolee, Kenner unequivocally agreed to searches of his person at any place
and any time as part of his parole agreement.

The search, which was directed by

Kenner’s parole officer, is thus reasonable as a search based upon valid consent.

6

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court reviews a district court’s order resolving a motion to suppress “using a

bifurcated standard of review.” State v. Huffaker, 160 Idaho 400, 404, 374 P.3d 563, 567
(2016). “This Court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous, but may freely review the trial court’s application of constitutional principles
in light of those facts.” Id.
C.

Kenner Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Suppression Motion
The district court properly concluded that the search at issue in this case did not

violate the Fourth Amendment. 1

“The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is

reasonableness. The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated searches
and seizures; it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable.” State v. Rios, 160
Idaho 262, 265, 371 P.3d 316, 318 (2016) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250
(1991)). Suppression is not warranted in this case because Detective Williams’s reach-in
search of Kenner was constitutionally reasonable as a search incident to arrest and as a
search based on valid consent. See State v. Schwarz, 133 Idaho 463, 468, 988 P.2d 689,
694 (1999) (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)); State v. Smith, 144 Idaho
482, 488, 163 P.3d 1194, 1200 (2007).

1

Although Kenner made passing reference to Idaho’s constitution in the district court and
on appeal, he has not substantively argued that Idaho’s constitution affords greater
protection than the Fourth Amendment in any way significant to this case. He has thus
forfeited that argument on appeal. See State v. Frederick, 149 Idaho 509, 513, 236 P.3d
1269, 1273 (2010); State v. Vasquez, 129 Idaho 129, 131-32, 922 P.2d 426, 428-29 (Ct.
App. 1996).
7

1. Detective Williams Conducted A Proper Search Incident To Arrest
It is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for “police officers to search
individuals who have been lawfully arrested.” State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 816, 203
P.3d 1203, 1215 (2009) (citing Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008)). The purpose of
the search is “‘to remove any weapons that the [arrestee] might seek to use in order to
resist arrest or effect his escape’” and to “‘seize any evidence . . . to prevent its
concealment or destruction.’” State v. Pedersen, 157 Idaho 790, 792, 339 P.3d 1194,
1196 (Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763).
A search incident to arrest, like any search conducted by the government, “must
be reasonable in its scope and manner of execution.” Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435,
448 (2013). A challenge to the reasonableness of the manner in which a particular search
was executed “requires a court to weigh ‘the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests’ against ‘the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an individual’s
privacy.’” Id. (brackets in original) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300
(1999)).

In conducting this weighing, courts must consider (1) “the scope of the

particular intrusion,” (2) “the manner in which it is conducted,” (3) “the justification for
initiating it,” and (4) “the place in which it is conducted.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
559 (1979). A review of the Wolfish factors, properly relied on by the district court,
confirms the reasonableness of the search.
The scope of the intrusion and the manner in which it was conducted were no
more invasive than necessary to recover the drugs from Kenner. As the district court
found, Detective Williams “pulled out the waistband of Mr. Kenner’s pants and
underwear, and retrieved the concealed drugs without touching Mr. Kenner below the
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waist or exposing Mr. Kenner to a third-party” and the “retrieval lasted only five to ten
seconds.” (R., p.253.) It is also clear from the record that Detective Williams narrowly
tailored his search to the area of Kenner’s body where he had been told Kenner had
hidden the methamphetamine, (Tr., p.45, Ls.5-9; p.57, Ls.6-9; p.58, Ls.3-4; p.68, Ls.2224), he did not see any other part of Kenner’s body, (Tr., p.58, Ls.10-11), and the other
officers nearby did not see Kenner’s buttocks, (Tr., p.12, Ls.12-16; p.45, Ls.20-22).
The justification to initiate the reach-in search was to seize the evidence, which
Kenner had placed in his buttocks, “‘in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.’”
Pedersen, 157 Idaho at 792, 339 P.3d at 1196 (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763); see
Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (describing the “destruction of evidence”
as a risk on “the government interest side” in “all custodial arrests”); State v. Bowman,
134 Idaho 176, 179, 997 P.2d 637, 640 (Ct. App. 2000) (describing “the necessity to . . .
prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence within the reach of the arrestee” as
one of “[t]wo exigencies” underlying the justification for a search incident to arrest).
Although this justification does not permit a reach-in search incident to every arrest,
Idaho courts have not required officers to turn a blind eye to evidence they have reason to
believe is on an arrestee’s person merely because the search required is more invasive
than a typical search incident to arrest. See State v. Chapman, 146 Idaho 346, 349-52,
194 P.3d 550, 553-56 (Ct. App. 2008) (finding “lawful search incident to Chapman’s
arrest” where officer “loosened Chapman’s pants and removed a plastic baggie containing
a rock of cocaine” after being told “that Chapman had cocaine in the groin area of his
pants”).

9

The officers here had reason to believe that Kenner had drug evidence in his
buttocks, which justified a reach-in search incident to Kenner’s arrest. The district court
specifically found that “[t]he confidential informant informed the officers that the
Defendant was concealing illegal drugs in his ‘butt-cheeks’” and that “[w]hile being
arrested, Mr. Kenner repeatedly attempted to reach the back of his pants.” (R., p.250.)
The record also makes clear that the officers knew that (1) Kenner “trying to reach into
his pants [was] indicative of somebody who’s trying to destroy evidence or get rid of
evidence” (Tr., p.58, Ls.16-23); (2) Kenner had been arrested in the middle of a
controlled-buy operation that started when Kenner had agreed to sell the CI
methamphetamine

(Tr.,

p.23,

Ls.9-12),

which

implies

he would

have had

methamphetamine on him at the time of his arrest; and (3) Kenner was on parole
supervision at the time of his arrest, in part, for Possession of a Controlled Substance (Tr.,
p.7, Ls.16-21; p.47 Ls.16-25); see Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 853 (2006) (“This
Court has repeatedly acknowledged that a State has an overwhelming interest in
supervising parolees because parolees . . . are more likely to commit future criminal
offenses.”) (quotation marks omitted).

These facts, taken together, provided strong

justification for Detective Williams’s reach-in search.
The place in which the search was conducted also supports the reasonableness of
the search. The district court found that “the search was conducted at night, on the side of
the road, with no third-party present at the scene.” (R., p.253.) The officers testified that
they had to “secure [Kenner] against the vehicle,” (Tr., p.28, L.18 – p.29, L.3), one officer
was on each side of Kenner (Tr., p.9, L.19 – p.10, L.5; p.19, Ls.14-20), “Detective
Williams was behind him,” (Tr., p.19, Ls.14-20), and “there was actually a patrol car
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behind Detective Williams,” (Tr., p.19, Ls.14-20). It was “around 8:30 at night” and it
was so dark that the officers “had to assist ourselves with flashlights.” (Tr., p.19, Ls.813.) Detective Williams testified that “there was no way anybody could see around us”
and that “[t]here would have been no way for anybody to see anything from the public.”
(Tr. p.68, Ls.13-19.)
The reach-in search incident to arrest by Detective Williams was thus reasonable
because the officers had reason to believe that Kenner had drugs under his clothing; the
officers ensured that the public’s view was blocked by Kenner’s own clothing, the
officers, and their vehicles; and Detective Williams conducted the search outside the
presence of any third party. This conclusion is supported by other courts that have
reviewed the constitutionality of reach-in searches. See, e.g., Jenkins v. State, 978 So.2d
116, 126-27 (Fla. 2008); United States v. Williams, 477 F.3d 974, 977 (8th Cir. 2007).
In Jenkins, officers worked with a CI to set up a controlled-buy at a gas station
targeting Jenkins. 978 So.2d at 118. When the CI signaled to the officers that Jenkins
had arrived, the officers made an arrest. Id. In a search incident to the arrest, one of the
officers “proceeded to pull the top of the boxer-shorts away from Jenkins waist area and
he then observed that ‘inside his [Jenkins’] butt crack sticking up was a sandwich bag.’”
Id. (brackets in original). The officer “removed the sandwich bag.” Id. at 118-19. The
Florida Supreme Court held that this reach-in search did not violate the Fourth
Amendment, even though it was conducted “at a public place,” because “Jenkins was not
required or forced to lower his trousers and boxer shorts,” “there is no indication that any
private body parts or the buttock area became publicly exposed,” and “the officers did not
touch Jenkins’ buttocks.” Id. at 126-27.
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Similarly, in Williams, after arresting Williams on a public street and moving
Williams to the precinct parking lot, one of the officers “opened Williams’s pants,
reached inside Williams’s underwear, and retrieved a large amount of crack and powder
cocaine near Williams’s genitals.” Id. The Eighth Circuit held that “such a search does
not unreasonably infringe on Williams’s privacy interests” because “[t]he parking lot is
partially secluded,” “no vehicles entered the lot during the search,” the officer “saw no
person other than police officers-either inside or outside the parking lot-within eyesight of
the brief search,” and “[t]o the extent any citizen observed the search without notice of
the police, there is no evidence that such a person would have seen the private areas of
Williams’s body or any contact between the gloved hand of the officer and Williams’s
genitals.” Id.; see also, e.g., State v. Williams, 255 P.3d 307, 314 (N.M. 2011) (holding
search incident to arrest “passed constitutional muster” where officer “pulled the
waistband of Defendant’s pants and underpants outward six to eight inches, looked down,
and saw a plastic bag underneath Defendant’s underpants” because officer had
“reasonable suspicion” Defendant had drugs in his pants and “the officers acted to ensure
that ‘public view was blocked by the defendant’s clothes, a trooper, and the cars’ on the
side of the road where the stop occurred”); State v. Jenkins, 842 A.2d 1148, 1158 (Conn.
Ct. App. 2004) (holding search incident to arrest reasonable where officers had
“reasonable suspicion” defendant was concealing drugs on his person because “[t]he
officers took the defendant to the side of the restaurant, away from the street and out of
public view” and “did not require him to remove any of his clothing, but rather pulled his
pants and underwear away from his body specifically to retrieve the glassine packets”).
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The unchallenged factual findings of the district court make clear that Detective
Williams conducted a “reach-in” search similar to those found to be reasonable by other
courts. (See R., p.253.) Like the defendants in each of those cases, Kenner “was not
required or forced to lower his trousers and boxer shorts,” “there is no indication that any
private body parts or the buttock area became publicly exposed,” and “the officers did not
touch [Kenner’s] buttocks.” Jenkins, 978 So.2d at 126-27; see Williams 477 F.3d at 977;
Williams, 255 P.3d at 314; Jenkins, 842 A.2d at 1158.
Kenner cites only a single case that he characterizes as a “reach-in” case that
purportedly found the reach-in search unconstitutional. (See Appellant’s brief, p.11)
(citing Paulino v. State, 924 A.2d 308 (Md. 2007)).) But Paulino was not a reach-in case.
See 924 A.2d at 318 (describing the search at issue as “far more invasive” than “a ‘reachin’ type search”). The court defined a “‘reach-in’ type of search” as a search that
“involves a manipulation of the arrestee’s clothes such that the police are able to reach in
and retrieve the contraband without exposing the arrestee’s private areas.” Id. at 318 &
n.6. “In contradistinction,” the court continued, “during the search of Paulino, his pants
were below his waist, his underwear was ‘lifted up’ and the cheeks of his buttocks were
manipulated and exposed.” Id. at 318. 2 In addition, in Paulino, there was “no dispute
that members of the public were present” during the search. Id. “It is their presence . . .

2

Four years after Paulino, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals faced a true “reach-in”
search case. See Allen v. State, 13 A.3d 801 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011). The court
distinguished Paulino as having “rejected the position . . . that this was a ‘reach-in’
search” and held that “[a] ‘reach-in’ search may be reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, even if it occurs in a public place, if the police take steps to protect the
suspect’s privacy.” Id. at 811.
13

that makes the search of Paulino unnecessarily within the public view and thus violative
of the Fourth Amendment.” Id.
No such circumstances exist here.

The district court specifically found that

Detective Williams “retrieved the concealed drugs without touching Mr. Kenner below
the waist or exposing Mr. Kenner to a third-party” and that there was “no third-party
present at the scene.” (R., p.253.) Kenner has not challenged those factual findings.
Kenner’s remaining arguments also lack merit. His assertion that the reach-in
search belongs on the “continuum of strip searches” for Fourth Amendment purposes is
more an issue of semantics than an application of the Fourth Amendment. 3
Appellant’s brief, pp.11-12.)

(See

Under the Fourth Amendment, “the balancing inquiry

remains the same regardless of how one characterizes the search.” BNSF Ry. Co. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Transp., 566 F.3d 200, 208 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see Stanley v. Henson, 337 F.3d

3

Notably, none of Kenner’s strip-search cases deal with fact patterns limited to a reach-in
search. See Amaechi v. West, 237 F.3d 356, 362 (4th Cir. 2001) (search of female who
was subjected to the “public exposure, touching, and penetration of her genitalia and
kneading of her buttocks during a search incident to arrest for a misdemeanor noise
violation”); State v. Harding, 9 A.3d 547, 549 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (motion to
suppress “the baggy of crack cocaine that fell to the floor as he took off his pants”);
Edgerly v. City and Cnty of San Francisco, 599 F.3d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 2010) (plaintiff
alleged officer “asked him to remove his shoes and socks, pull his pants down to his
ankles, and bend over and cough”); Kelsey v. Cnty of Schoharie, 567 F.3d 54, 63 (2d Cir.
2009) (officer stood in front of inmate while he undressed and changed into jail uniform);
Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 560 (1st Cir. 1985) (visitor of prison subjected to “skin
search” that meant she had to “undress and be strip searched” in order to visit her
brother); United States v. Dorlouis, 107 F.3d 248, 256 (4th Cir. 1997) (defendant’s
“trousers were pulled down”); Wood v. Hancock Cnty Sheriff’s Dep’t, 354 F.3d 57, 59
(1st Cir. 2003) (defendant was “required to completely disrobe three times”); Safford
Unified School Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 369 (2009) (13-year-old student
asked to remove stretch pants and T-shirt and “told to pull her bra out and to the side and
shake it, and to pull out the elastic on her underpants, thus exposing her breasts and
pelvic area to some degree”).
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961, 964 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Whether we . . . label the process a ‘strip search’ or merely a
‘search’ is unimportant, as the analysis remains the same.”).
Kenner “urges this Court to adopt a bright-line rule” that strip searches, including
reach-in searches, are per se unreasonable when conducted “in any public place, absent a
showing of exigency.” (Appellant’s brief, p.11.) That per se rule is inconsistent with a
proper Fourth Amendment analysis because “[t]he reasonableness of a search is
determined by the totality of the circumstances,” which will vary from case to case. State
v. Lee, 162 Idaho 642, 652, 402 P.3d 1095, 1105 (2017). Indeed, the Fourth Amendment
also requires, “[i]n each case,” “a balancing of the need for the particular search against
the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.” Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 559; see
Williams, 477 F.3d at 977 (rejecting “per se rule” against reach-in searches in public, in
part, because it is “inconsistent with the balancing approach of Wolfish”).
Moreover, Kenner’s proposed rule ignores the well-established justifications for
conducting a search incident to arrest—“the need to disarm the suspect” and “the need to
preserve evidence on his person.” United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973).
Although the risk of the defendant using a weapon or destroying evidence may eventually
dissipate upon arrest if the item is in a container that can be moved away from the
defendant after his arrest, see State v. LaMay, 140 Idaho 835, 839, 103 P.3d 448, 452
(2004) (evidence “not in danger of being destroyed” where “backpack was nearly fifteen
feet away from LaMay and located in a different room”), the same is not true when the
item remains on the defendant’s person or even within his immediate area, see State v.
Heinen, 114 Idaho 656, 659, 759 P.2d 947, 950 (Ct. App. 1988) (justification for search
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incident to arrest still present where defendant “placed the briefcase down at the time of
his arrest” where search “was limited to the area immediately around the defendant”).
Kenner also suggests there was a violation of the Fourth Amendment because it
was possible for the officers to delay the search until “Mr. Kenner was removed to a
private location.” (Appellant’s brief, p.13.) This implies that Mr. Kenner was searched
in a public location, which is true only in the sense that the officers searched him on the
side of a road, but it ignores the facts found by the district court that “the search was
conducted at night . . . with no third-party present at the scene.” (R., p.253.) There was
no need to remove Kenner to a more private location because no third-party could see the
search at the scene of the arrest.
Furthermore, the existence of “less intrusive means does not, itself, render the
search unreasonable.” United States v. Sharpe, 740 U.S. 675, 687 (1985). See also
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983). The facts of the case show that the
officers acted reasonably in conducting the search at the scene of the arrest rather than
waiting until Kenner could be moved to a more private location. Officer Widmier
testified that Kenner is “a big guy, strong.” (Tr., p.9, Ls.8-18). The district court found
“Mr. Kenner was uncooperative, and officers had difficulty controlling his hands.” (R.,
p.250.) “Mr. Kenner repeatedly attempted to reach the back of his pants” (R., p.250), and
Detective Williams testified “[t]hat was before and after he was in handcuffs” (Tr., p.56,
Ls.10-13), and that it was “indicative of somebody who’s trying to destroy evidence or
get rid of evidence” (Tr., p.58, Ls.16-23). In those circumstances, it was reasonable for
the officers, rather than try to continue to restrain Kenner and keep him from reaching
into the back of his pants until he could be removed to a more private location, to conduct
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a reach-in search at the scene of the arrest that “lasted only five to ten seconds,” “at
night,” “with no third-party present at the scene.” (R., p.253.)
2. Kenner Consented To The Search Via His Parole Agreement
Detective Williams’s reach-in search is also reasonable because Kenner consented
to it when he signed his parole agreement. A search is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment if it is “conducted with consent voluntarily given by a person who has the
authority to do so.” State v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745, 748, 250 P.3d 796, 798 (Ct. App.
2011). This consent can be a part of a defendant’s agreement to conditions of probation
or parole. See id.; State v. Ellis, 155 Idaho 584, 590-91, 314 P.3d 639, 645-46 (Ct. App.
2013). The scope of the consent is determined by the language in the agreement. See
State v. Jaskowski, No. 44772, slip op. at 6 (Jan. 18, 2018); State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho
841, 843, 736 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1987).
In Gawron, a probationer had agreed to a term of probation that stated: “That
probationer does hereby agree and consent to the search of his person, automobile, real
property, and any other property at any time and at any place by any law enforcement
officer, peace officer, or probation officer, and does waive his constitutional right to be
free from such searches.” 112 Idaho at 842, 736 P.2d at 1296. The court held that a
warrantless search of his house did not violate the Fourth Amendment because he had
“expressly waived his constitutional right to be free from warrantless searches.” 112
Idaho at 843, 736 P.2d at 1297; see Jaskowski, No. 44772, slip op. at 5 (“Gawron simply
waived all Fourth Amendment rights relating to searches of his person or property.”).
Like the language at issue in Gawron, the relevant language in Kenner’s parole
agreement waives his right to be free from searches of his person or property. Kenner’s
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parole agreement states: “Parolee will submit to a search of person or property, to include
residence and vehicle, at any time and place by any agent of Field and Community
Services and s/he does waive constitutional right to be free from such searching.” 4
(Exhibit A.) Detective Williams’s search of Kenner thus did not violate the Fourth
Amendment because Kenner “expressly waived his constitutional right to be free from
warrantless searches” when he signed his parole agreement. Gawron, 112 Idaho at 843,
736 P.2d at 1297.
Kenner argues that the search went outside the scope of his agreement because “a
strip search on a public street was not contemplated by those terms.” (Appellant’s brief,
p.13.) But the proper interpretation of a parole agreement, just like a condition of
probation, requires the court to “give force and effect to the words of the contract.”
Jaskowski, No. 44772, slip op. at 6.

And the plain language of Kenner’s parole

agreement allows for a “search of person . . . at any time and place.” (Exhibit A.)
Detective Williams’s search falls squarely within the plain language of the parole
agreement. As found by the district court, “[t]his search was a reach-in.” (R., p.253.)
The “officers placed Mr. Kenner against the car, pulled out the waistband of Mr.
Kenner’s pants and underwear, and retrieved the concealed drugs without touching Mr.
Kenner below the waist or exposing Mr. Kenner to a third-party.” (Id.) “[T]he search

4

The parole agreement states that the search can be conducted “by any agent of Field and
Community Services.” (Exhibit A.) That language includes police officers, like
Detective Williams, when they are “assist[ing] with a parole officer’s request to perform
a parole search.” State v. Armstrong, 158 Idaho 364, 370, 347 P.3d 1025, 1031 (Ct. App.
2015). The district court found, and Kenner does not contest, that “Officer Widmier, a
parole officer, ordered that Mr. Kenner be searched.” (R., p.250.)
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was conducted at night, on the side of the road, with no third-party present at the scene.”
(Id.) That is indisputably a “search of person . . . at any time and place.” (Exhibit A.)
Citing Armstrong, Kenner also argues that the search was not conducted under the
direction of the parole officer, as required by the parole agreement, because the parole
officer did not specifically tell Detective Williams to search “inside of Mr. Kenner’s
pants and underwear or his buttocks area.” (Appellant’s brief, p.14.) But Armstrong
does not require the parole officer to direct every detail of the search. It only requires the
searching police officer to “perform[] the search at the request and under the supervision
of the parole officer.” Armstrong, 158 Idaho at 371, 347 P.3d at 1032.
The district court found that Parole Officer Widmier “ordered that Mr. Kenner be
searched.” (R., p.250.) The parole officer requested a search of Kenner’s person without
limiting the scope to any specific areas of Mr. Kenner’s body. Parole Officer Widmier
testified: “I asked Detective Williams at that time, [w]ill you please search him, because
my two hands were occupied trying to control Mr. Kenner.” (Tr., p.9, L.19 – p.10, L.5).
Because Detective Williams limited his search to Kenner’s person, as requested by the
parole officer, the search was conducted by an agent of Field & Community services as
required by Kenner’s parole agreement. See Armstrong, 158 Idaho at 371, 347 P.3d at
1032 (holding police officers’ drug-dog search of Armstrong’s vehicle performed by
agent of Probation and Parole where “[t]he parole officer dictated the search within the
parameters of Armstrong’s Fourth Amendment waiver by requesting the officers use a
drug dog to search Armstrong’s vehicle”).
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Parole Officer Widmier ordered the search of Kenner’s person. That search
complied with the terms of Kenner’s parole agreement. Detective Williams’s search of
Kenner’s person was thus reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered upon
Kenner’s conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance.
DATED this 30th day of January, 2018.
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